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Abstract: Due to the invincibility nature of cyber attacks on 
the cyber supply chain (CSC), and the cascading effects of 
malware infections, we use machine learning to predict 
attacks. As organizations have become more reliant on CSC 
systems for business continuity, so are the increase in 
vulnerabilities and the threat landscapes.  Some traditional 
approach to detecting and defending malware attack has 
largely been antimalware or antivirus software such as 
spam filters, firewall, and IDS/IPS. These tools largely 
succeed, however, as threat actors get more intelligent, they 
are able to circumvent and affect nodes on systems which 
then propagates. In our previous work, we characterized 
threat actor activities, including presumed intent and 
historically observed behaviour, for the purpose of 
ascertaining the current threats that could be exploited.  In 
this paper, we use ML techniques to learn dataset and 
predict which CSC nodes have detection or no detection. 
The purpose is to predict which modes are venerable to
cyberattacks and for predicting future trends.  To 
demonstrate the applicability of our approach, we used a
dataset from Microsoft Malware Prediction website. 
Further, an ensemble is used to link Logistic Regression, 
and Decision Tree and SVM algorithms in Majority Voting 
and run on the training data and then use 10-fold cross-
validation to test the parameter estimation, accurate results 
and predictions. The results show that ML algorithms in 
Decision Trees methods can be used in cyber supply chain 
predict analytics to detect and predict future cyber attack 
trends.  
Keywords: Machine Learning, Cyber Supply Chain, 
Predictive Analytics. Cyber Security. Cyberattack 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The cyber supply chain system is very effective and 
efficient from a business process point of view as it 
ensures information flows, reduced inventory and service 
time to deliver [1].  However, from a cybersecurity 
standpoint, the CSC system is critically vulnerable due to 
the various connected network hosts and nodes. The CSC 
is a highly integrated network as it provides access to (1) 
various organizational services such as electronic 
commerce, online banking, distribution, and delivery (2) 
sensitive data such as Intellectual property, customer 
data, and financial data. Ensuring confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of the supply chain system has 
been a major challenge facing organizations in 
maintaining security on online services and information 
flows. The CSC systems are more vulnerable due to its 
integrated and distributed nature. It uses public facing IPs 
for the various organizations and third party vendors on 
the supply chain system and that makes it accessible by 
attackers. Recent studies have found that over 90% of 
Web hosts have serious vulnerabilities [2, 3] and 60 of 
the 100 most popular websites hosted or were involved 
in the malicious activity on supply chain systems. The 
malware attacks made possible on the supply chain are 
numerous and varied, but generally involve attackers that 
are either injecting a virus, a worm, a bug or a Trojan into 
software or in an HTTP request that could execute on the 
network and the on the webserver when processing a
request. Attackers could execute arbitrary commands on 
the supply chain systems remotely and that could cascade 
to other systems onto other nodes on the network. The 
attacker can then manipulate the vulnerable spots and 
maintain Advance Persistent Threats (APT) and 
Command & Control attacks. For the dataset, we use a 
publicly available data source from a Microsoft Malware 
Prediction website [4].
The aim of this paper is to use ML techniques to 
learn dataset and predict which CSC nodes have
detection or no detection. The purpose is to predict which 
modes are venerable to cyberattacks and for predicting 
future trends. To demonstrate the applicability of our 
work, we used Logistic Regression (LR), Decision Tree 
(DT) and SVM algorithms to test the data classifications. 
The novelty contributions are: (1) to used ML to 
analysis and understanding cyber supplier chain attacks 
by using cross-validation test on LG, SVM, and DT 
algorithms to generate true values to determine the 
algorithm that produces the better predictive 
performance. (2) Combined the three algorithms within 
Majority Voting (MV) to determine which of them 
produced the highest accuracy. The results generate a DT 
for our ML predictive analytics that predicts a has 
detection of no detection. The results show that ML 
algorithms methods can be used in CSC security to 
predictive analytics to detect and predict future cyber 
attack trends. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
In this section, we review related works and the state 
of the art in cybersecurity, machine learning and decision 
tree and how they are related to malware attacks on CSC 
systems. This includes identification of previous 
classification approaches, leveraging the classifications 
of malware with a specific data set and attack prediction 
tasks used.  The following are the related works: 
A. Machine Learning 
 Machine Learning (ML) technics are used to learn 
dataset to classify algorithms and for accurate predictions 
[5]. The purpose of using ML is to use previous 
cyberattacks to predict future attacks and make informed 
decisions [6]. Machine learning could be applied in smart 
grid cyber supply chain security environment to predict 
electric power fraud anomaly detection, the amount of 
suspicious transaction, substation location frauds, 
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network intrusion, and spam filtering for spear phishing 
attacks, as well as determine the probabilities of attacks.  
CSC systems include linking together of different 
organizational websites that align their business 
processes, goals, objectives, and some components of 
their systems to third party organizations, suppliers, 
consumers, and partners. We could use machine learning 
cybersecurity to detect anomalies in HTTPs requests 
such as XXE, XSS, SSRF attacks in communication 
networks, authentication bypass in password setting an
SQL Injection in the database.    Gallagher et al. 2009, 
develop a TTP attack classifier based on the vector space 
model used commonly for information retrieval. The 
authors used a machine learning approach to build a 
classifier to automatically label as request Valid or 
Attack. The authors approach for dealing with HTTP-
based attacks is to identify malicious code in incoming 
HTTP requests and eliminate bad requests before they are 
processed. They further demonstrated their approach 
through experiments on the ECML/PKDD 2007 
Discovery Challenge data set [7]. Hinks et al. 2014, 
explored the suitability of ML methods as a means of 
discriminating power systems disturbances. The authors 
evaluated various ML methods including OneR, NNge, 
Random Forest, Naïve Bayes, SVM, JRipper, Adaboost, 
in disturbance discrimination and the practical 
implication. They theorized that ML algorithms will 
leverage the non-linear complex relationship between 
power systems measurements and as to sufficiency to 
discriminate between non-malicious and natural 
disturbance [8].  Buczak et al 2016, carried out a survey 
that describes a focused literature survey for machine 
learning and data mining methods for cyber analytics in 
support of intrusion detection in cybersecurity 
applications. The authors discussed cybersecurity data 
sets and provided comparison criteria for machine 
learning and data mining methods for recognition of 
types of the attack (misuse) and for detection of an attack 
(intrusion) [9].  However, the techniques and methods 
used are not ML and DT. Sharma et al. 2007, reported on 
the feasibility of using ML techniques to detect variants 
of known worms in real-time.  The authors applied the 
SVM algorithm in standard pattern recognition in the 
work to worm detection problems. They investigated the 
optimal configurations of SVM and associate kernels 
functions to classify various types of synthetically 
generated worms. The used linear kernel to demonstrate 
the results using unnormalized bi-gram frequency counts 
as input [10]. Yavanoglu et al. 2017, proposed a dataset 
used in artificial intelligence and machine learning 
techniques which are the primary tools for analyzing 
network traffic and detecting abnormalities. The authors 
compared the machine learning techniques used for 
experiments, evaluation methods considered and baseline 
classifiers for comparison [11]. Villano, 2018, 
investigated the decision tree algorithm and its 
implementation in WEKA software. The author 
researched the processes of correlation and normalization 
of logs. The author further evaluated the algorithm that 
could predict an attack or not after a training phase using 
internet logs and proposed a framework designed for the 
normalization and correlation processes [6]. Bhamare et 
al. 2016, analyzed the performance of major supervised 
learning algorithms with different datasets namely 
UNSW and ISOT obtained in a simulated cloud 
environment for cloud security. The authors compared 
Logistic Regression, DT, Naïve Bayes, and SVM 
classification algorithms and their techniques [12].
  
B. Supervised and Unsupervised Machine Learning 
There are two types of ML: Supervised and 
Unsupervised: Supervised ML consist of working with a
dataset that includes both input and outputs parameters. 
Supervised learning is able to provide an accurate 
prediction of system performance using the dataset for 
training and dataset for testing. ML uses two types of 
algorithms: classification and regression: The 
classification algorithm is used to identify the major 
features or class level of each object, depending on the 
class to which it corresponds to when it was defined in 
the beginning. The classification could be separated into 
binary or multiclass. We use binary variables to detect 
positive or negative values.  Algorithms used include 
Logistic Regression, Support Vector Machine (SVM).,
Decision Tree.  
Regression algorithms are used to predict continues 
response values by utilizing knowledge of existing data 
to have an idea of the new data. It can be used to predict 
the cost of impact, asset value and cost of alternative and 
probability of fraudulent actions.  
Logistic regression is a classification algorithm in 
ML that is used to predict the binomial probability
of a categorical binary variable [5] and estimates the 
relationship between one dependent variable and 
one independent variable.  
SVM algorithm learns from the data itself what 
distribution of the features should be and therefore 
it is applicable in a large variety of situation when 
you want to catch all the outliers but also the 
unusual data examples [5].  SVM methods support 
outliers detection and can be specific for decision 
functions. The input vectors are non-linearly 
mapped to a high-dimension feature space [13]. 
Majority Voting (MV) algorithm used to verify that 
a prediction satisfies a majority in a given list of 
outcomes [5] determine the highest number or 
percentage representation in a list of algorithms.   
Unsupervised ML is more of a data driving approach 
with the intention to find anomalies in data. They are used 
when there are no labelled data and model should 
somehow mark it by itself based on the properties. 
However, it works less precisely than that of supervised 
approach as the system is not provided with data sets and 
therefore used for predicting unknown outputs [6].   
C. Decision Trees 
Decision trees are an efficient nonparametric method 
that can be applied to classification or regression tasks. 
They are hierarchical data structures for supervised 
learning whereby the input space is split into local 
regions in order to predict the dependent variable [15]. 
Barros 2015, posits that Decision trees and induction 
methods in general, arose in machine learning to avoid 
acquisition bottleneck for expert systems. [16]. DT is 
used as a method in ML for classification and regression 
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in large and complex data in order to discover patterns. 
DT is built as a tree-like structure that classifies instances 
of an event by plotting each malware attack attributes 
from the top, down to its root. The figure below shows an 
example of a DT. 
There are several approaches to ML classification 
and algorithms used such as LG, SVM, DT, Random 
Forest, Naïve Bayes, XBGoost, LightGBM, and 
CatBoost [5] that has been demonstrated as successful in 
the cybersecurity domain. We used LG, SVM, DT 
method to identify which attributes best fit the tree,
determine the best classification algorithm and provide 
accurate cyberattack predictive analytics. Challenges 
originating from the classification of the data sets could 
be numerous. For instance, identifying attacks that are 
initiated through Intelligence Electronic Devices on 
smart grid systems or those attacks that are initiated 
through classifying staff salaries based on qualifications, 
skills, and experience.  
III. APPROACH 
This section considers the different ML approaches 
that can be used to solve cybersecurity tasks and how 
they are related to CSC system threats. The algorithms 
used include DT, LG and SVM in majority voting. The 
aim of this paper is to use ML techniques in a decision 
tree to predict which CSC system nodes have detection 
or no detection. The process includes data description,
features Selection, choosing a classifier, performance 
















Fig 1. Machine Learning Process 
A. Dataset Description 
The dataset is about malware attack in Microsoft 
endpoint system and such a system can be a critical part 
of the CSC systems overall business continuity [4]. The 
dataset was designed to meet certain business constraints 
in regard to privacy and time period in which machine 
was used. CSC integrates various organizational systems 
for the business process and information dissemination in 
CPS environment. Hence, the dataset is relevant for our 
work as it was gathered from global machines that used 
Microsoft Windows Defender.  The data set containing 
these properties and the machine infections were 
generated by combining threat report collected by 
Microsoft Endpoint Protection Solution, Windows 
Defender. Each row in the dataset corresponds to a 
machine unique identified by a Machine Identifier. 
Further, the dataset was created to meet certain business 
constraints, both in regard to the privacy and when the 
machine was running. The rationale for using the dataset 
for our work is that the dataset does not represent 
Microsoft customers machine only as it has been sampled 
to include a much larger proportion of malware 
machines. For the dataset, we use publicly available data
from Microsoft Malware Prediction website [4].
B. Feature Extraction
Feature extraction assists in analysing the various 
classifications algorithms and ensure an accurate 
representation of the dataset. The extraction process 
involves using different techniques to select the available 
feature in the data for the application of the ML 
algorithms. The following are some features from the 
telemetry data relevant for our work. 
MachineIdentifier - Individual machine ID 
GeoNameIdentifier - ID for the geographic 
region a machine is located in 
DefaultBrowsersIdentifier - ID for the 
machine's default browser 
OrganizationIdentifier - ID for the organization 
the machine belongs in.  
Is protected - This is a calculated field derived 
from the Spynet Report's AV Products field.  
Processor - This is the process architecture of 
the installed operating system 
HasTpm - True if the machine has tpm over - 
Version of the current operating system 
OsBuild - Build of the current operating system 
Census_DeviceFamily - AKA DeviceClass. 
Indicates the type of device that an edition of the 
OS is intended for  desktop and mobile 
Firewall - This attribute is true (1) for Windows 
8.1 and above if windows firewall is enabled, as 
reported by the service. 
C. Choosing a Classifier 
The classifications are implemented using ML 
algorithms such as LR, DT and SVM in MV. For our 
study, we use the binary classification as it supports 
AUC-ROC in distinguishing between the probabilities of 
the given classes. Further, its precisions can predict 
correct instances, provides a harmonic mean for
precision, recall and F-score. The optimization algorithm 
is used to identify the major features or class level of each 
object. We used ensemble to combine the algorithms and 
test the dataset on each to determine the accurate 
prediction and best results. Further, a K-Fold classifier is 
used to run each algorithm 10 times for best results.
D. Performance Evaluation 
To evaluate the performance of the ML algorithms, 
confusion metrics are used in ML classifications to 
determine actual or predictive values precision, recall and 
F-Score. These values include the True Positive (TP), 
True Negative (FP), False Positive (FP) and False 
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Negative (FN). The accuracy of the confusion metrics is 
the proportion of the total number of predictions that are 
considered as accurate. We use the following equation 
[6] below to determine the accuracy (AC) of the matrix.   
Accuracy  = #    ( )#   ( )           (1) 
 
True Positive Rate (TPR)   =                           (2) 
 
Precision (P) determined as correct the proportion.  =                          (3) 
 
F-Score determines the harmonic mean of P and R.  = 2                    (4)   
 
The instances of the accuracies are based on the 
following classifications for the model prediction.  
TP = An instance that is classified as 
positive and predicted correctly as 
positive? 
TN = An instance that is classified as 
negative and predicted correctly as 
negative?  
FP = An instance that is classified as 
negative but predicted wrongly as 
positive? 
FN = An instance that classified as positive 
but predicted wrongly as negative? 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION 
This section discusses the implementation of the 
machine learning simulation process. The purpose of the 
study is to predict the probability of malware infections 
on Microsoft Windows. The dataset and the machine 
malware infections were gathered by Microsoft Defender 
endpoint protection [4]. The dataset corresponds to a 
machine identifier that provides results as to whether the 
Microsoft endpoints are able to predict if it can detect 
malware attacks on the nodes. Detecting malware on 
supply chain networks could be challenging as the 
various systems could respond differently due to its 
current status and time stamps. Some systems may be 
going through software updates, patches, upgrades and 
various configurations at various times. Hence, the 
implementation process used to generate the dataset may 
come with constraints. However, due to these challenges, 
we may experience different predictive results from our 
test data and in the cross-validation. Therefore, we used 
ensemble and combine three classification methods: 
Logistic Regression, DT and SVM for our machine 
leaving to determine the best results and the highest 
accuracy.   
A. Data Preparation 
The data was downloaded from the Microsoft 
Malware prediction (Kaggle) website [4]. The number of 
entries in the dataset we used was 20000. There were 62 
attributes in the data sets and they have all been 
correlated. The data was loaded from a pre-prepared 
dataset by calling the categories of the machine learning 
identifier. Then using the print command that loads the 
training set from the folder we have created. The output 
generated 20000 training datasets with 62 variables. The 
data was prepared by converting the average of the 
columns of the dataset and set the command to return the 
columns, the number of floats and the mean. The 
command removes all the duplicates in the training set.
 The output prints 62-8 = 54. (8 columns removed). 
However, the 20000 datasets were maintained. The 
output was: 
B. Preparing Data for the Ensemble Test  
The Ensemble was used as a method of bringing 
different algorithms together to test the dataset, choose 
performance metrics and determine their accurate
prediction [5]. The tools and the algorithm used are to test 
the data classifications, prevent overfitting and provide 
better analysis and understanding of the algorithms. We 
use the ensemble to test the dataset using LR, SVM and 
DT algorithms in MV. The pipeline was used to link and 
run the data frames together. A 10-fold cross-validation 
test was performed on the algorithms by training the data.
validate the parameter 10 times as the values could 
change when we run it only ones. GridsearchCV was 
used to provide an exhaustive search over specified 
parameter values for the estimator.  
C. Choosing an Optimization Algorithm: Combining 
LG, DT, SVM in MV  
Majority voting (MV) algorithm provides us with the 
ability to combine all the three algorithms in the 
classifiers to determine the mean score of the total results. 
The print should generate the ROC AUC for the 
percentage scores for the mean, standard deviation, and 
the label. The output is as below:   10-fold cross-
validation: 
ROC AUC: 0.66 (+/- 0.02) [Logistic Regression] 
ROC AUC: 0.58 (+/- 0.02) [Decision Tree] 
ROC AUC: 0.66 (+/- 0.02) [SVM] 
ROC AUC: 0.66 (+/- 0.02) [Majority Voting] 
D. Evaluating the performance of the Model: Plot 
Accuracy of Algorithms in ROC-AUC 
To determine the performance of the model, we plot the 
run the algorithms in ROC. AUC_ROC (Area Under 
Curve – Receiver Operating Characteristics) uses a
model selection metric for bi-multiclass classification 
problem to distinguish between the probabilities of the 
given classes.  It determines the True Positives Rates and 
False Negatives Rates [5]. We label it to determine the x-
axis as True Positive Rate and y-axis as False Positive 
rate. The output indicates that the DT has AUC of 0.59 
which is not a good prediction the TPR and FPR as it las 
less detection rate comparatively. We plot the graph 
below:   
69
 
Fig 2. Plot the accuracy of all the algorithms in ROC 
E. Tuning the Algorithm 
We use K-Fold parameter tuning also to fine-tune 
and determine the best results comparatively. For each 
value, we take 4/5 of the training set as train and 1/5 as 
K-Fold test. We train and check the ROC results and take 
the min_sample_leave value that gives provides the best 
results. The min_sampe_leaf was set to [200, 400, 500, 
600, 700, 800, 1000]. To increase the dataset to effect 
changes in the minimum sample graph in figure 3.
Fig 3. K-Fold Parameter Tuning 
F. Display Size Correlation  
G.
This section displays the correlation of the size of 
the screen to determine whether the machines have
detections. It counts the number of antiviruses installed 
on the machines and determines the size of the display in 
inches against the detection rate. Our output below shows 
that the ML algorithm counted that 3526 machines have
5.0 antivirus installed on it. 1341 machine has 4.0 
antivirus installed on it. 112 machine has 3.0 antivirus 
installed on it. 16 machine has 6.0 antivirus installed on 
it. 4 machine has 2.0 antivirus installed on it and 1 
machine has 1.0 antivirus installed on it.  
H. Display Detection Rate of the Training Datasets 
We plot the grid histogram of the detection rate of 
the training dataset to determine with the size of the 
screen has a correlation with the display size. The graph 
displays the Count, Display Size in Inches and the 
Detection Rate. The count indicates the processing 
counts of machines from 0-70. The display's size in 
inches indicates the size of the processes from 0-80 and 
the Detection Rate are from 0.0-0.8. The graph shows 
that from 5-10 the display size in inches increased from 
the count of the machines 4 to 35 indicating a detection 
rate of about 0.45. However, from 11-12 inches the count 
of machines went up to about 55 with a detection rate of 
0.65. Further the from 13-25 inches, the machines 
counted were up to 50 with a detection rate of between 
0.6. Similarly, from 26-35 inches the machine counts 
were about 48 but increased from 40-50 inches with a 
detection rate of  0.6. Similarly, from 36-45 inches the 
machine counts increased to about 48  but decreased to 
10 inches with a detection rate of  0.25. However, the 
inches increased from 46 to 65 with a count 65 and a
detection rate of 0.58. The screen size is a feature that can 
be used to predict the probability of an attack. We assume 
the display increases or detection size. The screen size is 
relevant in our machine learning as the screen size has a 
correlation with the detection rate.  
Fig 4. Display Detection Rate of the Training Datasets 
I. Impact of Disk Capacity of on Detection Rates 
The graph displays the total disk capacity from 0 to 
4,000,000. As the disk capacity increases, the rate of 
detection could go up or down. Considering the nature of 
machines in use, the machine counts may increase from 
0-98 with the total disk capacity from 0-500000 and an 
increase in the detection rate of 0.78. Conversely, the 
counts dropped to 22 on the total disk capacity from 
500,000-550,000. However, from count 22 the total disk 
capacity increased from 1000,000-2000,000 with a 
detection rate of 0.5. Further, the count increased again 
to 60 on the total disk capacity of  2000,000 with a 
detection rate of 0.55. Similarly, the count dropped to 60 
diagonally to 4000,000 on the total disk capacity with a 
detection rate of 0.55. These systems could be CPS such 
as industrial control system,  smart grid, industrial plants, 
transport and communication systems with high 
integration and providing real-time services. 
Fig 5. Impact of Disk Capacity of on Detection Rates 
J. Determining the Detection 
In this section, we compare the resolution ratio of
each graph below to the detection rates to determine 
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whether the system Has Detection or No Detection.  The 
Blue colour (0) has No Detection and the Orange colour 
(1) indicates Has Detection. The resolution rate affects 
the detection rates. For instance, the resolution ratio of 
0.562 indicates that out of a total of 2500 counts, has No 
Detection is 1200 and Has Detection is 1300. Similarly, 
the second graph indicates that the resolution ratio of
0.5625 has no detection of 780 counts whilst has 
detection has 1000 making a total count of 1780. Further, 
the third graph has a resolution ratio of 0.625 with a No 
Detection of 220 and Has Detection of 125 indicating a
total count of 345. Conversely, the fourth graph has a 
resolution ratio of 0.75 with a No Detection rate of 100 
and Has Detection rate of 95 indicating a total count of 
195.  Furthermore, the fifth graph has a resolution ratio 
of 0.7998 with a No Detection of 50 and Has Detection 
of 50 indicating a total count of 100. Similarly, the sixth 
graph has a resolution ratio of 0.666 with a No Detection 
of 33 and Has Detection of 34 indicating a total count 64. 
Comparatively, the fifth graph has a low detection rate to 
the 6th graph and could be vulnerable to malware attacks 
on the nodes.    
Fig 6. Resolution Ratio and Detection Rates
K. Decision Tree Prediction 
The prediction and analysis of the ML and the 
results are projected the DT simulation. The variables for 
training and testing the algorithms are extracted from the 
dataset. The root of the tree is the SmartScreen feature set 
to <= 10.5. The three depicts a nominal variable with two 
arrows indicating True for ‘Has Detection’ False for ‘No 
Detection’ from the root. We set the Gini to 0.5 so that if 
the engine is true the variable goes left and if the Gini is 
false, it goes left on the plot as the information gained.  
The dataset is set to 5000 with a minimum_sample_leaf
set to 200. The minimum_sample_leaf determines the 
depth of the tree. The value = [2464, 2536] is the 
summation of the dataset. The value 2464 predict No 
Detection on the machine nodes whereas the value 2536 
Has Detection. 
The AVProductsInstalled feature depicts a figure of 
<= 4.5, with a gain of 0.498. the sample size is 4414 and 
was split to determine the value which is [2361, 2063] 
with prediction class of Has Detection. Further, the 
AVProductsInstalled feature was split further as it 
predicted has detection. However, AppVersion_3 
predicted no detection, therefore, the tree was not split 
further down.  
   
Fig 7. Decision Tree 
L. Malware Attack Prediction 
In previous work, [1], we characterized threat 
actor activities, including presumed intent and 
historically observed behaviour, for the purpose of 
ascertaining the current threats that could be exploited. 
Further, we identified eight vulnerable spots and their 
probability that the cyber attacker could exploit those 
spots namely the: Firewall, IDS/IPS, Vendors CSC 
system, Network, IP Addresses, Database, Software, 
and Websites. In this work, we use ML techniques to 
techniques and develop intelligent cyber threat 
techniques that can predict which nodes on our system 
are venerable to malware attacks to be able to predict 
future attacks.   
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, 
we used the results from Microsoft malware attack 
prediction to determine the probabilities of the 
malware attacks on the CSC nodes. The goal is to 
predict windows machines probability of getting 
infected by various families of malware attacks based 
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on the properties of the machine. We use the eight 
attacks in the previous work [REF] above and relate it 
to the predictions in the section for our results.  
T. CSC Power System Framework Configurations 
The figure below depicts the power system 
framework configurations used in the smart grid 
environment [1].  Tier 1 covers the transmission and 
distributions domains, using high-bandwidth 
communication media such as WiMAX and Fiber on a 
wireless area network (WAN). The IED monitors and 
control the electric power transmission to the 
distribution system using the phasor monitoring unit 
(PMU) for measuring instantaneous bus voltage, line 
current, and frequency. The command centre integrates 
with the SCADA system servers and uses a 
switchboard to establish communication with the IED 
units. Tier 2 provides a gateway for the Wireless Area 
Network (WAN) technologies and communication 
utilities to have access to the customers’ premises for 
the CSC nodes.  and demand response applications. It 
uses a collection of Intelligence Electronic Devices 
(IED) units to collect the various Phasor Measuring 
Units (PMUs). A malware attack could be initiated on 
the IDE and the network and could lead to attacks on 
the CSC, substation and the tier 1 infrastructures. Tier 
3 integrates the local area network with the customer 
management systems (CMS) and uses the IED to 
communicate with the smart meter, which aggregates 
sensor information from various home appliance 
devices. We present the attack features in figure 8 and 































Fig 8. CSC Smart Grid 
U. Type of Malware Predictions 
The following are some of the attacks that could be 
initiated on the smart grid. 
Network Interruptions: remote attacks on the 
supply chain network nodes to cause interruption, 
interceptions, manipulation, and fabrications.     
Voltage Surges: a rootkit attack to cause 
resonance or DDoS attack on the components for 
the electric power to oscillate     
Software Errors: insert malware to infect software 
in order to cause application system 
manipulations and cybercrimes.    
Prepaid Card Setting Change: configurations are 
changed with a distance protection scheme to
manipulate the card and prevent the card from 
accurate readings.   
Smart Metering Tampering: configurations are 
changed with a distance protection scheme so an 
attacker can manipulate the software in the meter 
so that the meter does not read for a valid 
purchase or valid outstanding.   






Default Browser vulnerabilities and 
injecting code in the URL or website
Spyware/Ransomware Outdated Antivirus/Patches that are 
not updated regularly
Spear Phishing Use Reconnaissance to identify 
vulnerable spots and attach email with 
a virus
Session Hijacking Exploit Unchanged Hard-Coded 
password in software bought off the 
shelf
Rootkit/DDoS Attack on BIOS or attach a virus to a 
USB key to cascade when booting.
RAT/Island Hopping Attacks from Vendor systems to gain 
access to the organizational system
Ransomware/Malware Exploiting outdated OS versions and 
encryptions especially TLS/SSL
Malware/Spyware Packet injection and Resonance attacks
DDoS Exploit IP Address Systems and 
Packet injections
V. RESULTS 
The results of our implementation and our 
evaluation of the classifications of the various 
algorithms are as follows. The purpose of this paper is 
to use the ML techniques in a decision tree to predict 
which CSC system nodes have detection or no 
detection of malware. For us to have better predictive 
performances, we used several approaches for the ML 
classifications and algorithms such as LG, SVM, DT 
and MV methods to determine which algorithm 
provide the best predictive analysis attribute of the tree. 
The regression algorithms can predict continues 
response values by utilizing knowledge of existing data 
to have an idea of the new data. The classification 
algorithm was separated binomially.  The features for 
each object was identify depending on the class it 
corresponds to when it was defined for the 
classifications. For us to estimate the best optimization 
over the specified parameter values for our estimator, 
we used GridsearchCV method to cross-validation the 
grid search in the parameter tunings. K-Fold cross-
validation and a pipeline were used to link and run the 
various algorithms together for training the data to 
generate true values.  
Further, we use AUC_ROC (Area Under Curve 
– Receiver Operating Characteristics) curve to predict 
the dimensions of the graph. The TPR is determined on 
the Y-axis and the FPR is determined on the X-axis.  
Furthermore, to determine the mean score of the total 
results, we used the MV algorithm to combine the LG, 
SVM and the DT in the classifiers and set the 
classification method to a random state. The output 
indicates that after testing the dataset five times on each 
algorithm, the ROC AUC results for LG was able to 
predict that LG has 0.66 probability of being attacked 
with a T or F value of 0.02.  Similarly, the ROC AUC 
for DT was able to predict that DT has 0.58 probability 
of being attacked with a T or F value of 0.02. However, 
the ROC AUC for SVM was able to predict that DT has 
0.66 probability of being attacked with a T or F value 
of 0.02. Therefore, our analysis reveals that DT was 
predicted to have a 58% higher probability of being 
attacked. Results also show the maximum depth of I 
72
 
and C of 0.001 as the algorithm produced an accuracy 
of 66%. Finally, the DT depicts a tree that is able to 
provide ML with predictive analysis of machines nodes 
that Has Detections or No Detection. 
A. Comparing Results Existing Works  
There are several existing works on ML 
techniques for smart grid power supply environment 
for detecting malware attack prediction. For instance, 
Morris et al. 2014, used classification algorithms such 
as OneR, NNge, JRipper for rule inductions, Naïve 
Bayes for probability classification, SVM for the DT 
learning, Adaboost for boost a meta-algorithm for 
learning for their ML techniques. Further, Sharma et al. 
2007, SVM algorithm in standard pattern recognition 
in the work for worm detection problems. Furthermore,
Bhamare et al. 2016, compared Logistic Regression, 
DT, Naïve Bayes, and SVM classification algorithms 
and their techniques using WEKA. However, none of 
the authors, used LG, DT, SVM, RF in Majority Voting 
to compare their results. We used an ensemble to test 
the dataset. Further, we used Logistic Regression, 
Decision Tree and SVM algorithms to test the data 
classifications, prevent overfitting and provide better 
analysis and understanding. We used the pipeline to 
link the algorithms and run the training data and then 
use five-fold cross-validation to test the parameter 
estimation. We used GridsearchCV to estimate the best 
optimization to cross-validated the grid search in the 
parameter tunings. Further, we use AUC_ROC curve 
to predict the dimensions of the graph for the True 
Positives Rates and False Negatives Rates. The results 
show that ML algorithms and techniques can be used 
in cyber supply chain predict analytics to detect and 
predict future cyber supply chain attack trends.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Machine learning has been used in the cybersecurity 
environment and has become the major tool to predict 
attacks dues to the invincibility, uncertainty and 
fuzziness in cyberattacks and the complicated and 
integrated nature of CSC systems. In this paper, we 
have used the ML techniques and develop intelligent 
cyber threat techniques that can predict which nodes on 
our system are venerable to attacks to be able to predict 
future attacks.  To demonstrate the effectiveness of our 
approach, we used an ensemble to test the dataset. 
Further, we used Logistic Regression, Decision Tree, 
SVM and Random Forest algorithms to test the data 
classifications, to prevent overfitting and provide better 
analysis and understanding. We used the pipeline to 
link the algorithms and run the training data and then 
use five-fold cross-validation to test the parameter 
estimation. We used GridsearchCV to estimate the best 
optimization to cross-validated the GridsearchCV in 
the parameter tunings. Further, we use AUC_ROC 
curve to predict the dimensions of the graph for the 
True Positives Rates and False Negatives Rates. The 
tree predicts has detection or no detection. The results 
show that ML algorithms in Decision Trees methods 
can be used in cyber supply chain predictive analytics 
to detect and predict future cyber attack trends.  
Future works will look at other ML 
approaches such as XGBoost, LightGBM, CatBoost 
algorithms that are relevant for cyber threat predictions 
in CSC environment. Further, deep learning-based 
approaches will be studied in cyberattacks prediction 
and cyber threat intelligence gatherings.      
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